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This article discusses the process by which the law of cross-
border securitization evolves and becomes uniform.  In a former arti-
cle entitled Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, but Not Law-
less, I posited that “the laws governing cross-border securitization are
developed first by decentralized lawmaking ‘markets,’ and then ab-
sorbed by centralized lawmaking of communities, large intermediar-
ies, and corporations.”1  I suggested that a cyclical process is involved.
New forms of cross-border securitization and new legal issues emerge
while old forms and settled issues solidify into rules.  This article con-
tinues the inquiry.  The first part of the article also defines the mean-
ing of a unified cross-border securitization “law.”  Because much has
been written about cross-border securitization,2 the first part of the
article focuses on select features of the securitization transactions.
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1. Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, but Not Lawless, 8 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 255, 257 (1998).
2. See generally Symposium, International Issues in Cross-Border Securitization and
Structured Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 229 (1998); 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL
ASSETS § 7.02[I] (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2002) (discussing the recent legal
and regulatory changes in various countries, coupled with the development of structures that
minimize local market risk, that have resulted in a significant increase in the number of interna-
tional securitizations); Frankel, supra note 1, at 257 (describing decentralized and centralized
nature of the law that governs cross-border securitizations); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal
Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 229, 235 (1998) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Cross-Border Finance] (providing an overview of the “fundamental legal principles of
cross-border finance from the perspective of securitization”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a
Centralized Perfection System for Cross-Border Receivables Financing, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 455 (1999); Yoshiki Shimada & Shinji Itohi, Japanese Asset Securitization: A Guide for Prac-
titioners, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 171 (1997); Edwin E. Smith, The Draft UNCITRAL Convention
on Assignment in Receivables Financing: A Brief Overview, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 477
(1999); Thatcher E. Stone, In Flight Between Geneva and Rome: Abandoning Choice of Law
Systems for Substitute Legal Principles in International Aircraft Finance, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 487 (1999); Emil Arca, Cross-Border Securitization, REV. OF BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES, Feb. 14, 1996, at 21.
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These are the features relevant to the inquiry about unifying the laws
that govern the transactions.
In the second part of this article I ask: Who makes the law of
cross-border securitization?  The law of cross-border securitization
has been analogized to lex Mercatoria, that is, the law created by mer-
chants in dealing with each other, and the rules created by their insti-
tutions to facilitate these dealings.  I conclude that even though both
laws are “market made,” they differ mainly because the law of cross-
border securitization is developed not by the parties to the transac-
tions, but by lawyers.  I therefore call the law “lex Juris” after the
name of its creators.
In the third part of the article I ask: How do lawyers create and
produce unified law in a decentralized market?  To answer this ques-
tion, I examine lawyer-made law (LML) in the United States and in
civil law countries, and discuss the differences between LML gener-
ally and the lex Juris governing cross-border securitization.  The ex-
amination reveals how LML and lex Juris laws can be, and are, stan-
dardized in a decentralized, contract-driven market.
The fourth part asks: How is lex Juris distinguished from law-
making by political units, that is, the courts and the legislatures?  I
suggest that lex Juris reflects both types of lawmaking, but the mix is
different.  Lex Juris offers guides for the future, like legislation, not
resolution of past conflicts, like judicial decisions.  Yet, it pertains to
specific cases, like judicial decisions, and only later is it generalized in
form contracts and processes, like legislation.
The last part of this article addresses a broader question: Does
the system that is evolving today as lex Juris for cross-border securiti-
zation provide a useful model for other laws in a global context?  This
part anticipates the future of lex Juris.  In a fast-moving and change-
able environment, a system grounded in private lawmaking can be
more flexible and very useful when conflicts ultimately arise.  It can
be copied by other actors and adjusted to their needs, natures, and
cultures, to become a truly cosmopolitan private lawmaking process.
This private lawmaking, however, requires a relatively small group of
interacting private law-makers, and a peaceful coexistence with appli-
cable domestic laws.
I conclude that lex Juris belongs to a growing number of cross-
border contract-based legal systems, for example, laws concerning the
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Internet.3  Lex Juris may be the forerunner of a new type of lawmak-
ing regulating global activities: law-like rules that escape tight control
of domestic laws, but take them into account; rules that are highly
flexible for a fast-changing environment, but quickly unified into
standards and guidelines of sufficient predictability.
II.  ABOUT CROSS-BORDER SECURITIZATION
A. Purpose and Process
Securitization is a process by which illiquid financial assets are
converted into securities, to facilitate their sale and trade.4  One sali-
ent feature of the securitization process is its “disjoined” or “decom-
posed” nature.  It resembles a set of children’s Lego pieces that can
be connected in different ways to produce different results.  The ac-
tivities that comprise a securitization can be performed by different
actors in different places, and in some cases, at different times.  Thus,
a bank can make loans and either keep them to maturity, securitize
them immediately, or securitize them later.  A promoter can buy or
make loans and securitize them immediately or build an inventory for
later securitization.
After the loans are transferred to a special purpose vehicle
(SPV), control over the SPV may be vested in different actors de-
pending on their interest in the SPV’s assets.  If the transferor of the
loans provides collateral for the transferred loans, the transferor is
likely to hold the equity in the SPV, and seek control of it.  If credit
enhancement is provided by other institutions, the transferor may
have no interest and no entitlement to control the SPV.  The SPV dis-
tributes its securities either in a private placement or publicly.  Un-
derwriters of the SPV’s securities can be the promoter or other un-
derwriters.  Any qualified institution can service securitized loans,
and the service contracts can be sold and transferred to others who
will perform the task.  Any qualified rating agency can evaluate the
securitized loans.  In sum, the time, functions, and actors, may vary.
Further, the transactions are without borders.  The subject matter of
3. See, e.g., David Johnson & David Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Medi-
tation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET 62 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997).
4. See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.1, at 3 (1991 & Supp. 2002) (other defini-
tions focus on the process and the use of securitization, such as financing).
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the transactions—money and documents—can be transferred elec-
tronically from anywhere to everywhere.
B. Search For the Right Location
The designers of cross-border securitization activities can search
globally for countries in which the decomposed parts of the process
can be placed and operated.  The designers can then determine their
priorities and select countries on a number of grounds.  They can se-
lect countries that do not impose undesirable constraints, such as re-
strictive regulation.  Or they may choose countries on the basis of
amenities that they offer, such as efficient communications and serv-
ice infrastructure.  Parts of the transactions may be placed in coun-
tries that offer world-wide securities markets, such as the London or
New York Stock Exchanges.  Some countries are attractive because
of the large institutional investors that are domiciled there.
Even so, securitization takes effect in the real world, among real
people, institutions, or governments.  These are anchored in real
space and are subject to the laws of political entities.  A country’s
laws can be optimal for the purpose of one objective of the transac-
tion, but might not satisfy other objectives, such as minimizing taxes.
The country may not be the home of the investors, or may lack a de-
veloped infrastructure to support efficient operations, or may suffer
from political instability that increases the costs of doing business
within its borders.  Countries that attract the investors may repel
promoters, because of strict regulation for the protection of investors.
Countries that offer tax havens may not necessarily provide the re-
quired services and infrastructure.
Countries that do not offer a solid legal infrastructure for securi-
tization, such as Italy, may allow transactions to be performed across
borders.5  Therefore, promoters of cross-border securitization are
able to split activities and place them strategically to maximize the
utility and benefits of their environment, whether legal or otherwise,
and minimize costs.
C. Lex Juris Standardization
If the parts of cross-border securitization can change jurisdictions
and if the same transactions can be performed under different laws,
5. See Securitisation: An International Perspective, FIN. MARKET TRENDS, June 1995, at
33, available at LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (noting lack of specific legislative and regula-
tory framework; also noting problems with taxation and legal aspects of transfer of titles).
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like a chameleon, how can lex Juris contain even a semblance of stan-
dardized rules?
Two areas of cross-border securitization are standardized al-
ready.  One is the very process of securitization activities and the
choice of jurisdictions in which the various parts of the process are
carried out.  For example, when the bond rating of the government of
Venezuela fell because the country was experiencing political insta-
bility, the rating of the government-owned oil-producing corporation
fell as well.  The bond rating fell even though the corporation merited
a higher rating, because its financial situation was strong.  To reduce
the cost of the corporation’s financing, which had risen with the loss
of rating, the corporation securitized part of its oil receivables from
five of the largest oil companies in the world.  The credit of these cor-
porations was higher than that of the Venezuelan oil producer.  To
protect investors, the buyers’ payments for the oil shipments were
deposited in a U.S. bank, and payments to investors were transferred
directly from the bank without crossing Venezuelan borders.6
Another example relates to the issuance of “disaster bonds.”
The bonds are a form of securitized reinsurance of catastrophic natu-
ral disasters such as floods or earthquakes.  If domestic laws are hos-
tile to the securitization, as the U.S. laws were, the issuers of the
bonds go offshore, and their assets (reinsurance of disasters) may be
globally diversified.7  The design of these bonds has been standard-
ized to a great extent.
The second area of standardization relevant here is unification of
the laws of the countries in which securitization activities occur.  For
example, of immense importance to the investors and to the whole
process are laws that apply to the transfer of financial assets to the
SPVs, and bankruptcy laws applicable to the transferor of the finan-
cial assets.  The price investors demand for asset-backed securities is
affected by the degree to which the SPVs issuing these securities are
“bankruptcy proof”: that is, sheltered from the demands of the trans-
6. See generally PDVSA Pipeline to Begin Flowing, ASSET SALES REP. INT’L, Apr. 20,
1998, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; Leon Lazaroff, Structuring Flows,
LATINFINANCE, May 1998, at 73, available at LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; Thomas S.
Coleman, Piercing the Sovereign Ceiling, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 23, 1998, at 43, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
7. Tamar Frankel & Joseph LaPlume, Securitizing Insurance Risks, 19 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 203, 207 (2000).  These bond issuers may come back to the United States, when the
insurance laws are amended to receive them.  For current developments in the securitization of
insurance risk, see Ruth Gastel, Reinsurance, III INS. ISSUES UPDATE, Apr. 2001, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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ferors’ creditors, in the event that the transferor becomes bankrupt.
Standardization of these laws is important to the process.  In this re-
spect, the question is: to what extent does lex Juris help not only to
standardize the laws, but also to render them more sympathetic to in-
vestors?
III.  WHO CREATES CROSS-BORDER
SECURITIZATION LAWS?
A. The Law of Securitization Includes Lex Juris
Lawyers have a crucial impact on the law of cross-border securi-
tization.  Lawyers and other professionals, such as investment bank-
ers, create many innovative structures on which the success of the
transactions may depend.  Unlike other contract documents to which
the parties rarely resort, the documents of cross-border securitization
provide guidelines to which the parties refer frequently.
Therefore, a more accurate name and description of cross-border
securitization lawmaking is lex Juris.  This law is developed and es-
tablished by the lawyers who structure these transactions.  Lawyers
determine most of these terms, the legal frameworks, and the choice
of laws governing the transactions, as well as the location in which the
components of the transaction will be performed.
Further, the institutions in which lawyers are organized, and
which produce unified products, are not entirely similar to those of
merchants’ trade organizations.  Generally, lawyers’ institutions forge
stronger ties among members because lawyers who are expelled from
the organizations are expelled from their professions as well.  Some
trade organizations may exercise similar powers over their members,
but many do not, and members who wish to follow their own lonely
path can do so.8  By rights, the law the lawyers produce should bear
their name—lex Juris.
B. Lex Juris v. Lex Mercatoria
The lawmaking of cross-border securitization has been analo-
gized to lex Mercatoria.  Lex Mercatoria refers to the law created by
merchants in dealing with each other, and the rules created by their
8. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1727 (2001) (noting that in
domestic cash markets for purchase and sale of cotton, merchants and mills in trade organiza-
tions are not required to contract under trade rules nor arbitrate disputes with one another).
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institutions to facilitate these dealings, such as the guilds.9  However,
there are significant distinctions between the two.  Unlike the mer-
chants and their institutions, the parties to cross-border securitization
are not organized.  Further, they are not necessarily, and need not be,
repeat players.  They do not structure the transactions or the rules
under which they operate.  Rather, they express their needs and busi-
ness plans, which are then addressed in the transaction documents.
These documents are prepared by lawyers.  The actors rarely deter-
mine the structure, but rather dictate only the particular terms.
In lex Mercatoria the merchants and their trade organizations
create the law among the members.  Similarly, in the 1960s, when the
number of actors in the Eurodollar markets was small and consisted
of investment and large commercial banks, they followed a peaceful
coexistence of standardized explicit written transactions.  In the secu-
ritization area, including cross-border securitization, the equivalent
institutions of merchants, promoters, underwriters, and investors are
absent.  The actors are diverse and dispersed.  They do not negotiate
all the terms or parts of the securitization transaction.  The borrowers
and the promoters may negotiate the terms of the loans, but not the
credit enhancement, nor the structure and the law that governs the
transaction, nor the placement of transactions and their components.
IV.  HOW DO LAWYERS CREATE LAW AND HOW DO
THEY, IN A DECENTRALIZED MARKET, PRODUCE
UNIFIED LAW?
To answer this question, this section examines lawyer-made law
(LML) in the United States and in civil law countries, and discusses
the differences between LML generally and lex Juris governing cross-
border securitization.  The examination reveals how LML and lex Ju-
ris laws can be, and are, standardized in a decentralized, contract-
driven market.
A. The Development and Existence of Lawyer-Made Law in the
United States and Civil Law Countries
1. The Scope of LMLs.  In civil law countries, courts give great
weight to interpretative opinions of scholars.  These opinions have a
9. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Ap-
proach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1646–47 (1996).
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respectable place as part of the law of the land.10  In these countries,
rules and academic commentaries and opinions help achieve stan-
dardization.11  American LMLs form part of the American law, but
not as openly as in civil law countries.  American lawyers’ opinions
play a significant role in shaping the law.  Although their interpreta-
tions and opinions are not binding, the opinions often can provide
shelters from liabilities to third parties and change the balance of li-
abilities among clients in their relationships with others.12
Other LMLs consist of the legal documents that lawyers draft,
such as contracts, partnership agreements, trust instruments, and con-
stitutional documents of organizations, such as those of corporations,
limited liability companies, and so forth.  These documents become
the law for the parties.13  Although contracts are hailed as the epitome
of the parties’ freedom to determine the rules by which they operate,
and any variety would do, variety gives way to standardization, and
for good reasons.14
2. Standardization Is Efficient.15  Standardization facilitates the
development of markets by reducing information costs and risks, of-
fering predictability.16  The courts, both in common law and civil law
countries, have standardized property estates and limited their num-
bers for efficiency reasons, limiting the parties’ contract freedom to
10. Catherine Valcke, Legal Education in a “Mixed Jurisdiction:” The Quebec Experience,
10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 61, 96 (1995).
11. See James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the
Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 407 (1987) (noting that German civil
law code and its concepts were a “logically closed system”).
12. George M. Cohen et al., Whose Word Is Law? (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
The impact of lex Juris in the United States and academic works in civil law systems can be
explained by the relatively greater involvement of United States lawyers in transactions and the
lesser involvement of academics in the practice of the law as compared to civil law countries.  In
both cases, however, there is a body of law that is not produced by the formally authorized
lawmakers, the legislatures and the courts, and their delegates such as administrative agencies
or prosecutors and police.
13. See David F. Cavers, Legal Education and Lawyer-Made Law, 54 W. VA. L. REV. 177,
179 (1952) (listing examples of “laws that the lawyer writes”).
14. This approach contrasts with the judicial approach to property law, in which courts
seek standardization. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property; The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775–808 (1999) (arguing that a universal bank-
ruptcy law is more efficient than numerous country-specific laws).
16. See Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 398 (1993).
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change the number and terms of real property estates.17  Similar rea-
sons facilitate standardization in other areas.
Following precedent is also a form of efficient standardization.18
So is “path dependence.”19  Many contract terms are standardized and
their impact is significant.  In the United States, while law firms create
innovative and unique contracts, they also adhere without many or
frequent revisions to the forms they have created,20 or follow forms
that other lawyers have created.21  Shops offer standard lawyer-
drafted contract forms for many occasions, and many books contain
lawyer-drafted standard corporate and other forms.  So do other
publications.  Similarly, databases are developed that allow lawyers
easy access to accurate information about domestic laws all over the
globe.  These databases enhance uniformity of cross-border securiti-
zation.22  Standardized contracts and other forms drafted by lawyers
may indirectly shape the applicable laws because the courts are likely
to interpret the same or similar provisions consistently.  That renders
the interpretations more uniform, and the law more predictable.
3. It Is Lucrative for Lawyers to Create Innovative Contracts,
and Efficient for Lawyers to Convert the Contracts into Reproducible
Forms.  Standardization helps both lawyers and their clients.  Forms
can be adjusted when the laws change and can be kept up to date at
minimum expense, while new contracts require extensive checking
17. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, supra note 14 (noting that this principle is
recognized both in common and civil law countries); id. at 6 (suggesting an economic explana-
tion for the principle).
18. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pric-
ing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 257–58 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Cor-
porate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
20. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 18, at 258 n.46 (noting that firms create and urge use of in-
house form files) (citing JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 140–41 (1975)).
21. See, e.g., Legal Education Center to Open, AUSTIN BUS. J., Sept. 7, 2001, at
http://austin.bizjournals.com/austin/stories/2001/09/03/daily42.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002)
(noting continuing legal education program, Drafting Corporate Agreements, Converting the
Deal into an Effective Contract, to be braodcast to continuing legal education centers by satel-
lite).  
22. See Global Capital Markets Internet Library, at http://onlinestore.cch.com/default.asp?
ProductID=1655 (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).  Some of the publications of such databases also
provide, in select areas, advisory service such as standardized contracts, and documents.  See
Investment Planning Course (Second Edition), at http://www.onlinestore.cch.com/default.asp?
ProductID=519 (last visited Feb. 13, 2002) (describing Investment Planning Course, which in-
cludes diskette containing sample investment advisory agreement and engagement letter).  Such
documents are not yet available in the securitization area; they may become available with time.
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and are exposed to the risks of judicial interpretation.  A standard
form that has weathered attacks, especially if it has been revised in
reaction to judicial decisions, is more reliable and predictable than a
new form.  Lawyers can inform clients about the predictable results of
the contractual arrangements should conflicts arise.  Thus, even in an
area where customized arrangements are presumed to be the rule,
lawyers can standardize and unify the rules that govern the parties’
behavior.
4. Institutions in Which Lawyers Interact Contribute to Stan-
dardization of Legal Documents.  The institutional structures of law-
yers and the rules that govern them facilitate free transfer of expertise
and information on a regular basis.23  Lawyers’ organizations do not
prohibit, but rather encourage, specialization.24  Groups of specialists
facilitate interaction among the members because their interests are
similar and their number is relatively small.25  Referrals follow spe-
cialization and strengthen information transfers.
Many American states’ and lawyers’ organizations require law-
yers to continue their education throughout their professional ca-
reers.  Numerous academic and commercial “schools,” seminars, and
conferences offer short-term periodic classes to meet this require-
ment.  These schools also help networking among the attendees
through mealtime and weekend interactions in attractive locations.
The teachers in such schools are expert lawyers, eager to share their
ideas and experience with the audience as a form of advertising.
Thus, significant interaction and discussions on professional issues are
ongoing in legal communities.
Lawyers’ opinions of counsel and due diligence documents also
offer information and expertise and enhance uniformity.  Lawyers
discuss, argue, and provide a critical evaluation of new structures just
as they do interpretations of the law.  On one hand, they do not
blindly follow one another, especially if they are required to give
opinions or recommend other lawyers.  In such a case, their reputa-
23. For example, ALI-ABA, a collaboration of the American Bar Association (ABA) and
the American Law Institute (ALI), provides continuing professional education for lawyers in
different areas of law.  See This Is ALI-ABA, at http://www.ali-aba.org/aliaba/Thisis.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2002).
24. See id.
25. For an example of how lawyers help other lawyers understand the rules of cross-border
securitization, see generally Schwarcz, Cross-Border Finance, supra note 2, at 235, 254 (sug-
gesting that lawyers involved in cross-border securitization retain local counsel and ask relevant
questions).
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tion and exposure to liability are at stake.  On the other hand, while
they are not eager to write an opinion that courts would openly criti-
cize, they rarely seek to criticize their colleagues.
The tested and mass-produced transactional documents that
emerge from this process are the product of numerous revisions, sug-
gestions, and critical evaluations.  As clients and lawyers seek new de-
signs, and as the legal environment continuously changes, the process
of innovation and adjustments on the one hand, and the process of
unifying novel arrangements on the other hand, continue.  Therefore,
the institutions of the legal profession constitute a mechanism for in-
novating, adjusting, and unifying legal documents that lawyers pro-
duce.
5. LML Enforcement. Lawyers Prefer to Shelter Transactions
They Design from Litigation.  Litigation demonstrates the inadequacy
of the contracts and documents that the lawyers had prepared.  The
law firms’ practices, even if they have a litigation department, usually
litigate in protection and defense of their main clients.  The freedom
of their litigation departments to develop a practice in conflict with
these interests is quite limited.  Hence, these law firms take great
pains to ensure a smooth and cooperative execution of their transac-
tions.  The transaction documents include the substantive rules of be-
havior for the parties; the manner in which the rules are enforced; and
the institutions or persons which enforce the rules.  Thus, the creators
of LMLs are not inclined to encourage litigation and design LMLs
that incorporate other enforcement mechanisms.
In sum, voluntary arrangements, such as contracts, partnership
agreements, corporations, and the like are based on rules designed by
lawyers for the parties.  These documents are standardized over time.
After courts have interpreted standardized documents, judicial inter-
pretations are incorporated into these forms when necessary, for ex-
ample, by changing the terms to reach a result that is supported by
the decisions.
B. Lex Juris Differs From LML in a Number of Ways
1. Lawyers’ Ability to Choose the Applicable Domestic Law.
The choice of law made by lawyers must be embodied in the con-
tracts, subject to the final control of the courts.26  Because the choice
26. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.1, at 858 (3d ed. 2000) (stating
that contracting parties may select governing law, subject to limitations).
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of law in cross-border securitization is determined by locating the ac-
tivity in the chosen jurisdiction, at least with respect to that jurisdic-
tion, the choice of law is final.27  Although other jurisdictions may
have judicial supervision, if the questions reach their shores, the case
for overruling the parties’ choices is weaker.28
2. Choice of the Place of Operation Affects Chosen, as Well as
Bypassed, Countries.  This gives countries incentives to develop their
services, ameliorate their regulatory regimes, or permit their business
to go cross-border to securitize their assets.  Thus, the lawyers that
choose the host countries and design the documents for cross-border
securitization provide the forms that substitute for governing domes-
tic laws or affect domestic laws of the countries with which the proc-
ess comes in touch.  The reach of domestic laws is not merely stated
in the document but is determined by the parties’ choice of location
for their activities.29
3. As Compared to LML, Lex Juris Is Broader in Scope and
Coverage and Freer of Domestic Regulation.  The transactions cov-
ered by lex Juris are subject to weaker domestic regulation.  The very
nature, techniques, and objectives of cross-border securitization allow
the parties to choose those jurisdictions that leave them the most
freedom to design their own laws.30  The custom-made restrictive
rules are contained in the lawyer-prepared documents.31  In my opin-
ion there is a relationship between weak interference by domestic law
and the regulatory strength of the transactions documents prepared
by the lawyers.  I believe that the weaker the domestic laws’ interfer-
ence is, the stronger the impact of the transaction documents will be,
not only on the parties but also on third parties.
Further, the more entrenched the pattern of behavior of the par-
ties, the more notice third parties will have of that mode of behavior
27. See Schwarcz, Cross-Border Finance, supra note 2, at 237 (stating that French law ap-
plies to a financing involving French parties).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2), at 575 (1971) (stating
that in contract law, in the absence of effective choice of law by parties, contacts to be consid-
ered in determining applicable law include place of contracting, place of contract negotiation,
place of performance, location of the subject matter of the contract, and location of the parties).
29. See Schwarcz, Cross-Border Finance, supra note 2, at 244 (noting that in a securitization
investors must determine whether the jurisdiction(s) of the investors and/or SPV would enforce
the arrangement).
30. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 275 (stating that cross-border securitization requires par-
ties to “be free to design the applicable law”).
31. See id. (noting use of such rules in cross-border securitization).
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and the more bound the third parties will become to agreements con-
cerning outsiders.32  As domestic laws become more permissive, lex
Juris fills the gap and provides substitutes for domestic laws.33  Most
other lawyers dealing with similar situations share similar concepts,
and produce an evolving legal regime.
While LML is subject to the jurisdiction of the domestic courts,
enforcement in the cross-border context may be far more compli-
cated, and the courts are far less effective.34  Hence parties resort to
self-enforcing mechanisms, for example, mediations, arbitration or
enforcement by other intermediaries such as banks.35  If both parties
are in the same jurisdiction, such as the United States, they may re-
sort to the courts in that jurisdiction.  However, usually this type of
conflict among the parties does not relate to the documents of the
transactions.36
4. Lex Juris Provides the Substantive Rules of Behavior Among
the Parties to the Transactions. It Affects, Though Does Not Deter-
mine, the Rights of Outside Third Parties.  In cross-border securitiza-
tion, enforcement is performed by mechanisms other than the
courts.37  Courts rarely deal with conflicts among the parties.  In the
United States, which is notoriously litigious, only a few cases have
been litigated concerning securitization transactions.  These involved
mainly bankruptcy cases, involving parties such as the creditors of the
bankrupt transferor of the securitized financial assets.38  For the most
part, the parties to the transaction do not appear in these court
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(3) (1981) (stating that “usage of
trade” may supplement or qualify an agreement); U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (2001) (stating that course
of dealing and usage of trade “give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an
agreement”).
33. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 275 (noting that designs and contracts become customs
and are  “eventually absorbed into domestic laws that facilitate securitization”).
34. See id. at 278–79 (noting that with cross-border securitization, “the reach of govern-
ment regulators is reduced”).
35. See id. at 279 (noting that “[r]eliable, regulated intermediaries . . . provide an effective
private self enforcement”).
36. The LEXIS search “international and securitization” in the Mega library and Mega file
retrieved 50 cases, of which only two pertained to international securitization documents.
Search of LEXIS, Mega Library, Mega File (Feb. 5, 2002).  These cases are Argonaut P’ship,
L.P. v. Grupo Sidek, S.A. de C.V., No. 96 Civ. 1967 (MBM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15925
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1996), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1151 (2d Cir. 1998); and J.L.B. Equities, Inc. v. Ocwen
Fin. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
37. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 278–80 (discussing various forms of private enforcement).
38. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 4, §§ 10.7–16.
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cases.39  There is no international court or organization to which the
parties resort in the case of disagreements.40
Thus, the parties’ agreements govern their rules of behavior.
However, these agreements do not govern those who are not parties
to the agreements,41 such as the creditors of the transferors who have
become bankrupt.  The agreements do not prevent the creditors from
claiming the securitized loans, unless, of course, the creditors are
deemed to have agreed to the transfer by notice of the transfers.  In
some countries such an agreement must be made before the creditors
extended credit to the transferor.42  In some countries the agreement
must be explicit.43  In other countries, such as the United States, if the
parties follow certain procedures, such as perfection, the agreements
are implicit.44  Nonetheless, because third parties can resort to domes-
tic courts and domestic laws, lex Juris does not afford full protection
for the parties to these agreements.
V.  DISTINGUISHING LEX JURIS FROM LEGISLATIVE
AND JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
Lex Juris shares features of both legislation and judicial deci-
sions.  But the mix of these features differs.  This type of law is similar
to the common law in the sense that it starts not from general princi-
ples and rules, but from particular cases.  To conserve resources by
avoiding repetition lawyers prepare and use documents repeatedly.
The documents are changed to reflect changes in applicable laws, and
adjustments to particular situations.  Lawyers also prepare research
memoranda that are kept in their libraries.  Members of the law firms
39. Cf. Realtek Indus., Inc. v. Nomura Sec., 939 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (borrower
sued the investment banker in an aborted arrangement and in which the status of the parties’
arrangement is unclear).
40. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1023 (2000) (“Established international courts . . . are only
competent to hear cases between States.” (citing BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES,
CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 38–39 (1995))).
41. A contract is defined as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1, at 5 (1981).  Since a party that is not a party to
the contract makes no promises, it is not bound under the contract.
42. Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing:
UNCITRAL’s Contribution, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 315, 345–46 (1998) (citing German
law).
43. Id. at 346 (citing PHILIP R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY AND
GUARANTEES 39 (1995) (discussing Japanese and Spanish law)).
44. Id. at 347 (citing U.C.C. § 9-302 (1) (1994)).
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then resort to the memoranda, making additions or amendments to
reflect and add to them with experience and legal changes.  This prac-
tice is especially prevalent before a publication appears, addressing
the developing area of law.  Law firms today periodically publish
news of developments in many areas of the law and send them to cli-
ents as scholars, marking the in-house experts in the areas.
Lex Juris is similar to legislation, however, because it is designed
mainly to provide rules for future behavior rather than resolve con-
flicts that arise from past behavior.  Yet, the form contracts of lex Ju-
ris and processes often contain mechanisms for resolving disputes,
usually by arbitration.  In this way, lex Juris resembles private legisla-
tion that is later codified into more general rules.  Arguably, contracts
and processes are different from legislation and rules because they do
not contain general principles.  The difference, however, depends on
how we define law.  The arguments over whether courts, for example,
create law are long-standing.  Whether implementing, applying, or in-
terpreting law is lawmaking depends on the definition.  I submit that
contract is law made by the parties for the parties, and sometimes
with effects on third parties as well.  While memoranda are not en-
forced by the courts, contracts, corporate documents and other
documents are.  That is why these documents can be viewed as pri-
vate law among the parties and others that are affected by them.
Lex Juris is similar to a reverse restatement of the law.45  It con-
sists of numerous examples that follow certain underlying rules.
While many lawyers continuously update their documents and memo-
randa in-house, they also offer updates to clients and other lawyers in
publications that serve to advertise their skills and in-house talents.46
The individual contracts and the information about their contents re-
sult, however, in “best practices” and accepted norms of behavior.
Courts often adopt these norms of behavior, at times in spite of the
parties’ explicit contract provisions.47  So does the Uniform Commer-
45. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 8 (1934) (stating that the object of the Restatement is
“to present an orderly statement of the general common law of the United States”).
46. This author receives at least ten periodic publications of this type from various law
firms in her area of interest.  ALI-ABA and other organizations offer lawyers conferences,
seminars or courses in which the law is updated.  A significant number of the faculty in these
seminars consists of practicing lawyers.  For example, the author has co-chaired an advanced
course on the regulation of investment companies for the past seven years in which practicing
lawyers as well as regulators share their understanding and knowledge with the audience of law-
yers.  Information often includes the arrangements and contracts among the parties in addition
to court decisions, regulators’ actions, and legislation.
47. To be sure, “best practices” are used when the terms of the contracts are deemed
vague.  But often vagueness is in the eye of the beholder, and may depend on the chosen rule of
FRANKEL_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:08 PM
490 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:475
cial Code.48  Thus, specific contracts and best practices feed on each
other.
If the effectiveness of a lawmaking system is tested by the low
number of court cases that are generated, then lex Juris in cross-
border securitization transactions should be viewed as a great success.
As mentioned, the American community is considered by many to be
one of the most litigious, and yet I found only two cases—J.L.B. Eq-
uities and Argonaut Partnership—that involved securitization outside
the United States.49
VI.  A NEW MODEL FOR PRIVATE LAWMAKING
IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
In a fast-moving and changeable environment, a system
grounded in private lawmaking can be very useful.  It is more flexible
than domestic or international legislation and can be copied by differ-
ent actors and adjusted to their needs, nature, and culture to become
a truly cosmopolitan private lawmaking process.
This private lawmaking, however, requires a relatively small
group of interactive lawmakers, and a peaceful coexistence with ap-
plicable domestic laws.  Even though its members live in different
countries and different cultures the group must share skills and con-
cepts, goals and institutional interactions.  These are the glues that
bind them together and provide them with a common language.  As
such groups proliferate, we can expect them to create the kind of
rules that govern not only themselves and their members but also
those whom they affect.  Lawyers across the globe constitute one such
group, and became part of the private lawmaker population.50  Hack-
interpretation.  A dictionary meaning of a word may bring a different result and different ambi-
guities as compared to the meaning of the word in a particular context.  A dictionary meaning of
vehicle may include a pram and an ambulance, both of which are modes of transportation.  In
the context of a prohibition on vehicles in the park both forms of transportation may be ex-
cluded.  A pram—because it makes no noise and is not a danger to pedestrians—and an ambu-
lance—because even strollers’ convenience should give way to the need for medical help.
48. See U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (2001) (stating that course of dealing and usage of trade “give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement”).  But see Lisa Bern-
stein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (arguing for enforcement of the contracts without re-
gard to industry practices).
49. Argonaut P’ship, L.P. v. Grupo Sidek, S.A. de C.V., No. 96 Civ. 1967 (MBM), 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15925 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1996), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1151 (2d Cir. 1998); J.L.B. Eq-
uities, Inc. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
50. “Doctors Without Borders” constitutes a similar group.  See What Is Doctors Without
Borders/Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), at http://doctorswithoutborders.org/about (last visited
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ers across the globe working on the development of the Internet con-
stitute another such group.  They are in contact with each other and
have forged a powerful sense of community.51  They too have become
a part of the private lawmaker population.
There are interesting similarities between these technical and le-
gal specialists and between the ways in which they interact.  Like law-
yers in cross-border transactions, the Internet technical personnel
have tools to create constraints and rules necessary for a predictable
and orderly interaction among actors.  “Open codes” that compete
with proprietary technical innovations are similar to information
sharing among lawyers that competes with proprietary innovations in
the legal profession.52  The Internet professionals create and abide by
protocols that are crucial to the smooth functioning of the Internet,
yet entirely voluntary.53  Lawyers have adopted similar processes that
are crucial for cross-border securitization yet entirely voluntary.54
Lex Juris and the rules under which the Internet functions belong
to a species of cross-border, contract-based systems.55  Uniformity of
the laws, rules, and forms, whether in the context of cross-border se-
curitization or Internet protocols, is driven by the quest for efficiency,
the desire to avoid risk, and the need for order.  At the same time, the
pattern of achieving these objectives allows for experimentation and
creativity, and greater and faster adjustments to changes in the envi-
ronment.56  These features are necessary for maintaining the respec-
Feb. 1, 2002) (stating that doctors and other health professionals volunteer with the organiza-
tion to provide health care in over 80 countries).
51. See Overview of the IETF, at http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2002) (“The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a large open international community
of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the
Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet.  It is open to any interested in-
dividual.”).
52. For example, in ALI-ABA courses, lawyers “volunteer their time and expertise to lec-
ture and prepare written materials for the benefit of their professional colleagues.”  See This Is
ALI-ABA, at http://www.ali-aba.org/aliaba/Thisis.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
53. See Overview of the IETF, supra note 51.
54. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT (2002).
55. See, e.g., David Johnson & David Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Medi-
tation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET 62 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997).
56. Whether a country will adopt lex Juris in its domestic laws sooner rather than later de-
pends on its values and culture.  That depends on whether the allure of stability will outweigh
the limitations on creativity and flexibility.  In any event, diversity among countries is beneficial
in itself, for it helps weigh the benefits and drawbacks of each pattern and its suitability to a par-
ticular culture and to cross-border securitization as a system.
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tive systems.  I submit that if the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) protocols were not followed, the existence of the Internet as
we know it today would be unlikely.  Similarly, if lex Juris were not
followed, securitization as we know it would be unlikely to exist.
As compared to the process of creating domestic laws and inter-
national treaties, the process of creating lex Juris is more flexible.
That is because the process avoids the procedural and political
straightjackets of domestic and international institutions.  While lex
Juris rules are flexible, they can be quickly unified into standards and
guidelines of sufficient predictability.  That is because the group that
produces the rules is fairly homogeneous and interactive.
The law-like rules produced by such lawmaking establish a new
kind of relationship with domestic laws.  The rules escape the tight
control of domestic laws, even though the planners of the transactions
take domestic laws into consideration.  At the same time, because the
planners can choose where to place the components of their transac-
tions, those countries that seek to host the transactions and reap the
benefits they bring tend to meet, at least in part, the demands of the
private lawmakers for legal accommodation.
Similarly, the Internet protocols are not imposed by any govern-
ment, yet are followed not merely by IETF members but by all actors
in the Internet infrastructure.  That does not mean that the govern-
ments have no impact on the technical decisions through their own
technical spokespersons.  It means that governments play a role by
voicing their opinions and concerns, which are taken into considera-
tion.
While the details of lex Juris rules can be quickly standardized
and changed, the norms on which the rules are based are not neces-
sarily shifting and unpredictable.  In a changing environment the way
to preserve norms and values may be by changing the details of the
rules.  I believe that lex Juris and Internet protocols represent funda-
mental values that command a consensus.  If these law-like rules de-
viate from these values, the choices for private lawmakers will narrow
because domestic laws are likely to put them back on track.  Lex Juris
may be the forerunner of a new type of law-like rules that cut across
nations to regulate specific global activities.
